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Latin America is a region characterised by consistently high potential
economic and social development, but it faces serious difficulties
ill accomplishing this task. Throughout the last decades, we have
experienced several lapses of economic growth, always followed
by moments of stark recession. Such economic growth cycles have
always been tremendously difficult to maintain and, most of all,
to shift the positive results of Latin American economies
to social development on the continent.
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1. Introduction
In a certain way, the economic history of South
America has been a permanent alternation of cycles.
A typical stop and go. Or, according to some, like a
chicken flying. Always short and low. This problem
of inconsistent economic growth inhibits long-last-
ing ways of implementation of social plans that are
not welfarist on the part of most Latin American
governments. Long-term planning becomes
unfeasible to enforce whenever economic imbalances
generate an environment of constant uncertainty.
These uncertainties do not relate to Latin American
governmental policies only, but mostly to political
decisions that are always dependent on the financial
possibilities offered at a given moment. Thus, it is
possible to understand a little why, regardless of reia-
tively stable phases of economic development, gov-
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ernments prefer to act in a welfarist and populist way.
Society, in turn, mostly intellectually underdevel-
oped, believes a patronising state is what they need
to escape from poverty and develop socially.
Over the last four years, emerging economies
in Asia have grown 7.7% per annum on average.
Europe has grown 5% over the same period, whereas
Latin America did not exceed 4.5%. Even though
this growth rate is not sensational, it is valid due to
the volatility of Latin American economies. From a
collective point of view, it is a good result for Latin
America. However, some disparities exist as to coun-
tries such as Chile, which has grown at almost 7%,
and Brazil, which ended 2005 with a meagre 2.5%
GDP growth rate. Despite being regarded as satis-
factory for governments and international economic
monitoring agencies, it has been very difficult to re-
flect this result in investment in social areas in Latin
America. Nowadays, 40.6% of Latin Americans live
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under the poverty line, whereas 16.8% are in a situ-
ation of absolute poverty.
2. Economic Growth
vs. Social Development
To understand this difference between eco-
nomic growth and social development, we need to
seek support in some historical and structural aspects.
The process of colonisation on the Latin American
continent was responsible for leaving traees of so-
cial relationships that have marked the forms of
progress of society as a whole. The system created
was not sufficiently competent to encompass every
area, sector and need of society, eventually leading
to the growth of isolated groups and generating a
social gap.
The lack of consistency and durability in so-
cial and economic development in Latin America -
mostly in South America - has political, economic
and social reasons that are interconnected, replicat-
ing a model of disadjustment that feeds on itself and
perpetuates, and are lost in the history of the coloni-
sation. South America may be seen as a failed State-
funded enterprise, where Creole elites have repro-
duced the model of servile relationship with the State
marked by spoliation and unfairness towards the less
favoured and politically disarticulated classes. Nowa-
days, we see an alliance between the State and the
elites to exploit public resources: The State through
corporatism and the elites by means of exemptions,
subsidised credits and benefits to supply the State
(which is the big economic agent in the region). The
elites defend themselves from the State because the
latter may punish them by way of selective taxation
and non-participation in the benefits as well as by
the huge power of direct (with direct investment, such
as Petrobras, Furnas, PDVSA) or regulatory (rules,
laws, bureaucracy etc) intervention in the economy.
According to Luiz Fernando Figueiredo, former di-
rector of monetary policy of the Brazilian Central
Bank under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
"the decisions concerning pension plans, labour law,
welfarist, patronizing, discouraging efficiency gains
and, consequently, productivity gains, are responsi-
ble for the difficulty the State has in maintaining
steady and sustainable economic growth."
State intervention in Latin America is visible.
Sometimes, it is suffocating. Due to the power of
interference held by the State, its actions and deci-
sions either harm or benefit private enterprise a lot.
A relationship of dependence is establ ished in which
the State can either help or hinder. It can hardly ever
be fair and balanced. For instance, according to the
World Bank, you need 63 days on average to open a
firm in Latin America, whereas the same task can be
accomplished in 19.5 days in the OECD. The number
of procedures in Latin America is 11.4, whilst there
are 6.5 in the OECD. This difficulty for private en-
terprise to meet its potential eventually reflects in
the swelling of the State machine by means of more
and more civil servants. Direct interventions in eco-
nomic development implemented by the State by
means of companies such as Petro bras and PDVSA
generate a sentiment of a patronizing State in soci-
ety.
In Brazil, for instance, 40% of the GDP is di-
rectcd for public expenditures, whereas emerging
economies in Asia use approximately 25% to this
end. These heavy expenditures by the State eventu-
ally suffocate the participation of private investment
and the attraction of foreign investment, which main-
tains its effort in 20% of the GDP.
According to Luiz Fernando Figueiredo, "most
Latin American states opt for adopting a model closer
to European welfare than to macroeconomic liberal-
ism, as adopted by Asian countries that are growth
leaders in the modem world." This growth model,
which is already under crisis in Europe, works very
precariously in Latin America, since we do not have
enough funds to promote efficient and comprehen-
sive welfare. The social gap is widened by this failed
process that leads whoever has financial conditions
to invest in private education and healthcare, whereas
most of the population, who cannot afford such
things, is dependent on public investments in health,
education and security, for instance.
Such difference between economic growth and
social development results also from the lack of ar-
ticulation between intellectuals and politicians, with
rare confluences between them. We also often see
an archaic intellectual direction within Latin Ameri-
can academic circles. The ideological pattern of edu-
cation, due to historical reasons, is aimed at the in-
tensive use of the State to solve economic and social
development issues and, given the State's relevance
and society's dependence thereon, the centre of eco-
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nomic and social development is the State rather than
free enterprise. It is as if free enterprise comple-
mented the State's efforts in promoting wealth, rather
than the opposite.
The ability to link up the economic develop-
ment of a country to its social development is the
responsibility of governments and of the society that
elects them. However, in Brazil, for instance, the
State attracts and demobilises society by means of
cheap welfarist schemes such as Bolsa Familia (a
monthly allowance given by the federal government
to families earning less than the minimum wage) and
expensive welfarism with subsidised credits and spe-
cific tax exemptions.
3. The Role of Intellectual Capital
Curiously, in this part of the world, intellec-
tual capital shifted to economic growth is much more
advanced than any other capital. Perhaps intellec-
tual capital aimed at the arts is the only one to have
such a distinction. This is not enough to bring pros-
perity and put the continent on the track of the ex-
pected growth. We have brilliant economists, old-
fashioned social thinkers and mediocre governors
who are, in many cases, corruptible. This combina-
tion represents what Latin America is. We have re-
alised that the application of sustainable develop-
ment is not assigned to the economic area only, be-
cause it is necessary that intellectual development
specialise in the management of society, something
that is paramount.
The elites do not want to engage in direct ad-
ministration of power, but rather to deal with the State
by means of other instruments: campaign financing
and corruption. The State rewards them by offering
different types of welfarism: Bolsa Familia, subsi-
dised credit, tax exemptions, licenses, authorizations
etc.
What one sees is lack of articulation among
three sectors that should be working towards both
economic and social development: the political sec-
tor, by means of the State machine and political in-
stitutions; the economic sector, with the private sec-
tor starting to invest in science and technology and
investing in human resource, like major firms in first
world countries do to obtain qualified human re-
sources; and the university sector, which is supposed
to graduate people able to enter the job market with
a curriculum in line with contemporary world needs.
The first piece of criticism often made is say-
ing that such type of directing would prioritise the
formation of technicians only, lagging behind in
terms of scientific formation and basic research.
Many times the Brazilian 70's case is cited, when
there was investment in education in the areas of
engineering, but little in humanities, encompassing
philosophy, sociology, political science, anthropol-
ogy, history, human geography and other derived
disciplines, besides lagging behind in basic research.
This is a clear mistake. What one sees is that, in de-
veloped countries, companies need people that arc
more and more specialised and, most of all capable
of producing knowledge and developing technology,
something tbat is possible only at universities with
the necessary infrastructure, or in high-capacity labo-
ratories. What one identifies is the investment of
these large companies to ensure high level, qualified
personnel, unlike what might be said.
Concerning the Brazilian example, it is not
applicable. There was investment within some plan-
ning, conceived by the military regime, which was
tied to objectives of fast economic development, by
prioritising specific sectors to ensure an economic
leap. There was no thought of articulation between
State, private enterprise and society.
As such, we realise that these universes are
more and more distant and do not allow an intellec-
tual elite to appear with the ability to understand pri-
vate enterprise and act within it, besides being able
to control and participate in the political process. The
most relevant aspect is in the impossibility of build-
ing bridges between the State and the society so as
to allow resources resulting from economic growth
periods to be appropriately transferred to society, by
means of feasible plans that configure real social
needs.
Although we have potentially brilliant intel-
lectual elite, it is outdated or stagnated, with few
sectors as exceptions. Therefore, we eventually limit
ourselves to not enhancing a suitable discourse claim-
ing people's needs, even because one cannot
configure what structural solutions arc correct for
Latin American societies. Thus, there is no public
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4. Conclusionopinion formed, resulting in the inability to choose
leaders and control them, let alone to introduce via
the relevant channels alternatives to any proposals
they present.
What one sees are leaders who are indifferent
or incapable of going beyond their power needs, as
well as peoples that are impotent to recognise their
paths and fight on a democratic basis for their needs.
Unfortunately, this is a reality that will only
be changed by means of structural reforms that will
need a relatively long time to be able to configure
elites that are aware of their social role and fight for
it. The neural point is the institutional aspect, some-
thing one cannot see in the horizon for the short term.
Bridges need to be built, and working to promote
the awareness of our academic sector is one of the
most urgent missions. •
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